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Since the late 1990s, France has been experiencing a new wave of Chi-nese migrants, which, unlike older migratory flows, is coming from thecities of northern China. Relatively little is known about this recent flow,
however, because it quite often takes place illegally and consequently does
not appear in official data. (1) Even so, in the 2000s it was estimated to amount
to tens of thousands of people, at a time when the number of Chinese na-
tionals or people of Chinese origin in France was thought to be between
200,000 and 300,000. (2)
Despite its minority status within the Chinese diaspora in France, (3) this re-
cent migration is especially interesting because it differs both from the tradi-
tional profile of economic migrants and from that of the majority of Chinese
people in France, who originate from the Wenzhou region in southern China.(4)
One of its characteristic features is that it is made up mostly of women whose
socioeconomic situation was fairly good before they decided to embark on
their migratory project. (5)
This article, which draws on the analysis of ethnographical interviews car-
ried out in Paris between 2004 and 2010, (6) focuses in particular on the fac-
tors that prompted the interviewed women to leave their native country.
In view of this mainly female migratory flow, we will look at whether this
gender imbalance tells us anything about the transformations in social and
gender norms that specifically affected northern Chinese city dwellers in
their forties in the 1990s. By looking at women’s life trajectories, we will
try to gain an understanding of how their migratory project was shaped and
what role their experience of gender social relations and gender discrimi-
nation played in their decision to migrate. By revealing difficulties that are
not necessarily exclusive to women but which bring into play social expec-
tations and resources that often differ between the sexes, this article will
attempt to show the impact of gender social relations in China on the con-
figuration of this flow and on the meaning given to migration by the mi-
grants, both male and female.
An atypical female migration: 
The theoretical approach
The international migratory flows from China to Europe have become
greatly diversified over recent decades, with a significant contingent of mi-
grants now coming from northern China, especially to France. (7) Some of
the characteristics of this new migratory flow challenge certain traditional
representations that depict economic migrants from developing countries
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as being mostly young men from rural areas who are poorly integrated in
the local labour market and generally have few qualifications. (8) On the con-
trary, the migrants from northern China who were interviewed in Paris left
their country when they were about 40 years old, and had on average nearly
20 years of professional experience in China. As city dwellers employed by
state-owned enterprises and having received secondary or higher education,
they considered themselves to have enjoyed a relatively privileged socio-
economics status before leaving. Moreover, this new migration consists
mainly of women, who comprise nearly 70 percent of these pioneer migrants
and generally make the journey alone. (9) The women in their forties whom
we interviewed had all been married in China and were mothers of adoles-
cent children or young adults living in China. However, the majority of them
are divorced (80 percent of our sample), whereas most of the men we inter-
viewed are still married in China. Finally, the solitary nature of their departure
is a feature of the trajectories of all these migrants, who come from regions
with no tradition of international mobility and had no contacts in place who
were likely to help them on arrival in their destination country. (10)
The specific position of female migrants has long been neglected by re-
searchers, who considered mobility to essentially be a response to economic
stimuli (11) and therefore one primarily affecting men, as they were seen as
the main income earners of the family. According to this view, which is in
keeping with the division of labour on gender grounds, it was assumed that
women did not migrate, or if they did, they were considered to do so as
passive actors dependent on their husbands or fathers. (12) Questions con-
cerning integration of the second generation in particular have helped shed
light on the roles of migrant women, first in the transmission of culture and
identity to their children in a family context, then in their participation in
the society of the host country, and finally in their access to the job mar-
ket (13). Taking this perspective has helped introduce the gender dimension
as an analytical and relationship-based category in research on mobility,
and therefore to consider the way in which representations of the social
roles of men and women are culturally and historically constructed. (14) As a
principle of differentiation and hierarchisation between the sexes, gender is
connected to other power relationships, and structures the functioning of
societies, institutions, social relations, and daily practices, (15) these all being
aspects that shape the experience of migration. Appreciating the varying
representations of male and female roles across countries and over time,
the researchers considered whether the mobility of women played a part
in changing gender social relations in terms of increasing the independence
of women, or conversely reinforced inequalities and traditional roles.(16) The
analysis then revealed the diversity of situations between women with re-
gards to the constraints on them and the resources accessible to them, de-
pending on their ethnic origin, age, level of education, etc. Finally, further
studies also helped illustrate the “gender-oriented” dimension of migratory,
work, and family policies in destination countries.(17)
This article is an extension of this structural analysis, but focusing instead on
the country of origin. Its aim is to analyse the way in which gender relations in
the home country before migration may have influenced migratory decisions.(18)
The analysis will focus on the explanations given by the women interviewed in
Paris as to why they left and will examine the three main themes that are
broached: changes in the structure of the job market, in economic resources, and
in family relations. These three thematic levels have often affected men and
women differently, and can be used to analyse the economic and social changes
taking place at the turn of the century in terms of the gender relations that ex-
isted before the departure of this generation of city dwellers in their forties.
Presentation of the field work and
methodology
This article is drawn from a doctoral thesis currently being written,
which analyses developments in the migratory projects and trajectories
of male and female migrants from northern China living in Paris in highly
precarious situations. Making contact with this type of population is
complicated; the migrants lack legal status, grasp neither the local lan-
guage nor social codes, and are often reluctant when it comes to any
kind of interaction with “foreigners,” i.e., the non-Chinese population. Ac-
ceptance is all the more difficult due to the fact that the majority of mi-
grants have difficulty distinguishing the researcher from the local police
authorities. Moreover, their legal status, the precarious nature of their
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professional, economic, social, and emotional lives, and the drop in so-
cioeconomic status experienced as a migrant all hinder building the re-
lationship of trust necessary for ethnographical interviews. My approach
therefore began indirectly through community activities in various
Franco-Chinese organisations in Paris. This enabled me to meet male and
female migrants as a French teacher or interpreter, within the context of
social support activities as a mediator for women practicing prostitution
on the street, and as co-organiser of a Chinese women’s speaking group.
The sample was subsequently expanded gradually within the social net-
works of my contacts, which enabled me to meet people with a great di-
versity of trajectories, until a “saturation point” was reached and the
same life stories began to recur (19). The exchanges, which were initially
based on concrete activities, later led to the establishment of a relation-
ship of trust, and it was in this context that in-depth interviews took place
in Mandarin in the form of life history and semi-structured interviews with
64 migrants (50 women and 14 men) between 2004 and 2010. (20) Fifteen
of these people were interviewed at regular intervals to track the devel-
opment of their migratory projects. These activities also provided the op-
portunity for participant observation and informal exchanges in schools,
work places, dormitories, places of prostitution, flea markets, etc. This
ethnographic approach allowed me to grasp the subjective points of view
of the actors.
The male and female migrants interviewed for this research arrived in
France between 1998 and 2005, when they were between 35 and 44 years
of age. Most of them were originally from the provinces of Liaoning, Shan-
dong, and Hebei, and the Tianjin municipality, but a smaller number were
also from cities in Henan and Jilin provinces. Before leaving, 15 of them
were unemployed, while the others had kept their jobs in state-owned en-
terprises, had created their own companies, or had found new but unstable
work. All had been married (apart from one woman who had been engaged)
and were the parents of at least one child, but 40 of the 50 women were
divorced, whereas only two of the 14 men were.
Over the course of the interviews, it became apparent that although the mi-
grants found themselves in highly precarious circumstances in France,(21) most
of them had belonged to far from disadvantaged social categories in China.
On the contrary, their living conditions there are described as being clearly
better than average for China. The female migrants included workers with few
qualifications, but also a large number of women in intermediary professions
(such as accountants, sales people, team leaders, etc.), as well as managers and
businesswomen who had created their own private companies. In spite of the
diverse natures of their life trajectories, the male and female interviewees de-
scribed relatively privileged life courses. As employees of state-owned enter-
prises, they had had access to a series of benefits placing them in an average
socioeconomic category. Their jobs were, in theory, lifetime employment, and
although they were paid low salaries, this was offset by a global support system
guaranteeing free or subsidised access to housing, health care, education for
their children, distribution of material goods, and retirement. Although their
incomes before leaving ranged from 400 to 4,000 yuan a month (22), it is the
satisfaction level of these migrants that is really telling. Mrs. Yu, whose salary
of 400 yuan makes hers one of the more modest incomes in my sample, was
responsible for quality control in her factory. She considered herself “about av-
erage. We were not very poor, but we did not have any money (saved up).”
At this point in the descriptions, there appears to be little of relevance to explain
why these women went abroad; after all, they considered themselves to be well
integrated in the job market, society, and at the family level. Furthermore, as ex-
state employees, they did not witness any noteworthy discrimination at a pro-
fessional level until the 1990s, and seem to have had access, at this time, to
roughly the same resources as men. The reform period, which was characterised
by uncertain policies (23) and modified the structural framework in which their
lives were evolving, forced a change in their trajectories. (24) The courses of their
lives were marked by a series of more or less pronounced disruptions that brought
into play self-image and the interviewed migrants’ perceptions of success. The
effects of these national policies had an impact first of all at the employment
level, then on incomes and finally on the family dimension. As we are now going
to see, their migratory project consequently took shape largely in response to a
series of “accidents” that occurred in their life trajectories.
Migration, a response to gender
discrimination in the job market
The accounts of our interviewees place particular emphasis on the impact
that the economic reforms introduced at the end of the 1970s had on their
lives. At first, these were seen on the whole as positive, in that they allowed
city dwellers to raise their general living standards. However, in the 1990s, the
way they were perceived became more mixed, and the people interviewed
have an ambivalent and even critical view of these changes, which they feel
put their ability to adapt under excessive stress. Well before they decided to
leave for abroad, there were many signs indicating how the lives of some of
these women were being turned upside down, as described by Mrs. Wang:
Women aged 35 do not find work easily. My salary was very high. I
worked hard from the age of 18. When I was 36, our company sud-
denly went bankrupt, and everything I had collapsed. Our retirement
was no longer guaranteed. Our incomes fell to pitiful levels of two
or three hundred yuan a month. What can you do with two or three
hundred yuan a month in China? [...] In China, you can open a shop
and earn lots of money, but one day the government can say that
you have to demolish it all, and then you are left with no shop and
no money. That happened to a lot of my friends, including in my work
unit. [...] There are lots of things over which you have no control,
which you cannot make happen. I feel insecure. I do not know what
might happen in the future. I’m afraid of being poor. Although I have
money at the moment, I do not know how long I will be able to live
on it.
What emerges from the life histories of the pre-migratory period of the
people interviewed is a dual sentiment of living in an uncertain period char-
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acterised by a challenge to past gains and by the knowledge that major and
unpredictable changes were just around the corner. The climate of insecurity
seems to have manifested itself most on the professional level. Many of the
female migrants interviewed in Paris described themselves as xiagang
zhigong, i.e., employees and workers of state-owned enterprises suspended
temporarily, in principle, and living from small allowances or finding them-
selves without resources. The withdrawal of the state from direct control of
the economy and the introduction of capitalist rules led to a restructuring
of China’s economic fabric. The state-owned enterprises that formerly em-
ployed most of the urban population and managed both production and
social organization were considered unprofitable and were forced to restruc-
ture in order to adapt to the market. Some turned to new activities, merged,
or were privatised, but many also closed between the 1990s and the
2000s. (25) The restructuring of the economy was therefore accompanied by
mass urban unemployment estimated at 40-60 million people during the
period from 1993 to 2003. (26) The regions in the north and northeast of
China, which had until then been renowned for their heavy industries, were
among the worst affected. (27) According to Mrs. Yu, when she left at the start
of the 2000s, half of the inhabitants of her city, Fushun, were xiagang, and
for most of the male and female migrants interviewed, being xiagang was an
obvious justification for leaving. This kind of explanation tends towards fitting
the migration of city dwellers from northern China into the theoretical con-
structs of the new economy of migrations, which like neoclassical theories
assume that international mobility results from gaps in living conditions and
wages between different countries. From this perspective, migrants are seen
as informed economic actors who go abroad to optimise their incomes or to
reduce economic risk by diversifying the income sources of their house-
holds. (28)
Although the migrants spoke little about the different trajectories of men
and women, scientific literature emphasises that the employment crisis
linked to structural reforms in the Chinese economy has not affected the
urban population uniformly and has had varying impact on men and
women (29) (see the article by Isabelle Attané in this special feature). The first
to be made redundant are those considered the least adaptable to the new
requirements of productivity and flexible working conditions, (30) i.e., older
workers, those with the fewest qualifications, (31) and women. The latter
group represents nearly 60 percent of the xiagang even though they make
up only 40 percent of the work force. (32) It is no coincidence that all three
criteria apply to the profiles of most of the female migrants interviewed in
Paris. Generally, the gender criterion partly coincides with the first two in-
dicators, age and qualifications, and reveals that despite claims of gender
equality under the Maoist regime, access to educational, political, and fi-
nancial resources was “gender oriented.” (33)
In China, as in many other countries, the women of this generation have,
on the whole, completed less schooling than their male counterparts. For
this reason, they have often been confined to poorly paid jobs requiring few
qualifications in companies in the manufacturing and service industries, the
very sectors that lost the most jobs following the restructurings. They were
thus ill-equipped to confront this redundancy policy compared with their
male counterparts, (34) who often possessed valuable technical knowledge
that enabled them to negotiate to keep their positions or find alternative
work after being laid off. “In China, what people look at is your level of ed-
ucation, not your experience,” explains, Mrs. Li, who feels that the 15 years
she spent in the management team of a company with more than 1,000
employees are unlikely to help her find a job. With the increasing rate of
unemployment, gender equality in terms of access to the job market has
worsened considerably for this generation. (35) The early retirement mecha-
nism has also distanced women from the world of work, given that they
were put into early retirement at the age of 45, five years earlier than men
in the same sector. (36)
Compounding this is a “gender-oriented” perception of age. Many of the
female migrants interviewed who were aged around 40 consider themselves
to be old, whereas men of the same generation do not share this view of
themselves. As Mrs. Ding explained, age is one of the determining factors
explaining why women are excluded from the job market:
Good companies want young people; there is an age limit, and I’m
nearly 40 years old. It’s difficult to find a good job. In China, [employ-
ers] are looking for people between 18 and 30 years old. Sometimes,
they want to find people who are not yet married.
Therefore, the trajectories of migrant women show that the combined cri-
teria of age, undervalued qualifications, and gender representations have
not only selected which workers are suspended but have also continued to
hold them back in their search for stable employment commensurate with
their qualifications in a deregulated job market. However, this tendency to
define oneself as xiagang needs to be qualified. Most of the interviewed
women actually had a job and/or income at the time of their departure.
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Only a minority of them had been effectively unemployed for a long period
of time. Some had kept their position in a state-owned enterprise, while
those who had been laid off had more often than not either created their
own companies or found other work, but were not satisfied with their new
work and salary conditions. Mrs. Yu, for example, has done several jobs in-
volving “physical labour,” and describes them as follows: “Temporary work
is very tiring; the salaries are not high; you do not know how long [the boss]
will want you to work.”
Migrating to escape economic insecurity
This exclusion from the State-regulated job market has inevitably
brought with it a form of economic insecurity. Concern over their ability
to maintain a comfortable standard of living for the family unit was the
second recurring theme brought up by the female migrants interviewed in
Paris. The turn of the century in China was characterised by a sudden in-
crease in urban poverty (37) that had not existed under the Communist
regime. In 1999, this poverty is thought to have affected nearly 7 percent
of city dwellers, but it was more pronounced in certain provinces where
the industrial fabric was structurally more vulnerable to economic restruc-
turing. For example, in Liaoning, the native province of many of the inter-
viewed migrants, poverty increased by nearly 800 percent between 1988
and 1995. (38) Mrs. Dou, who was originally from Tianjin, likewise said, “Our
city did not feed us!”
The first people affected are those who, having lost their job, find their
unemployment insurance discontinued. In principle, Chinese law claims to
maintain the income level and social security of a person who loses his job.
In reality, however, some people find themselves destitute, their only income
coming from allowances that are too low to maintain their living standards,
or indeed they find themselves with nothing, because bankrupted compa-
nies do not always have the legally-mandated social security measures in
place. Having been ordered “back home” without compensation, Mrs. Yu and
her colleagues were able, after several months of protesting to the author-
ities, to obtain payment for their salary arrears and compensation for breach
of contract equal to a month’s salary for every year worked. She therefore
received 8,000 yuan for the 21 years she had spent in her factory. People
who are suspended from their jobs therefore suffer a major drop in income,
and the likelihood of xiagang families finding themselves in poverty is con-
sequently three to six times higher than that of other urban households. (39)
These situations, which more often affect women, also have different effects
on men and women due to of the different family and social expectations
placed on them.
The feeling of insecurity expressed by the female migrants interviewed
also stems from the fact that the state’s social security system is being
called into question? (40) due to changes in the economic model. Therefore,
while work units were previously responsible for most of the needs of their
employees, the feeling of no longer having any social safety net and being
able to rely only on oneself has left a deep impression on people, as Mrs.
Ding explains:
There is no social system in China. If you work, you have your salary;
if you do not work, you do not receive any unemployment benefits.
There are no family allowances, and education fees are very expen-
sive. And if you fall ill, a day in hospital costs a month’s salary, if not
more.
The family is at the heart of two central concerns often voiced in the stories
of female migrants, and is related to the cost of healthcare (41) and education.
Access to these services, which was previously almost free, now seems to be
threatened by market principles, because the two now command exorbitant
prices that often stretch the financial means of the population. (42) Therefore,
as Mrs. Dou explains: “Everyone has to pay for their own healthcare. If you
do not have the money, the hospital will not let you in, and you will die out-
side. No one will look after you. […] The deposit [for admission to the hos-
pital] is 5,000 yuan.” “The tuition at good universities is very high. Most
families can’t afford it,” explains Mrs. Ding, who gives the example of a good
university in Shenzhen where “one year’s tuition costs 20,000 yuan, while
the salary of an average worker is 10,000 yuan a year; before even consid-
ering the cost of food and drink, how are you supposed to find this money?
You have to save up.” With increasing competition on the job market, young
people also face unemployment, and university qualifications, especially from
reputable institutions, are a deciding factor in their search for a good job.
Parents thus feel it is their duty to provide their child with access to a uni-
versity, even if this entails running up debt.
“Both child and parents need support at home. If the parents fall ill, it’s all
over. [The equivalent of] one month’s living costs go up in smoke,” explains
Mrs. Dou. Having to simultaneously assume responsibility for parents who are
ageing and therefore more likely to fall ill, and for enrolling their only child in
higher education, puts the generation in their forties in a particularly precar-
ious situation. Assuming what are seen as essential duties to their dependents
confronts them with an unprecedented need for money. Indeed, the men and
women interviewed in France find it difficult to contemplate not allowing
their only child to continue schooling or failing to provide their parents with
health care. To do so would call into question the meaning they attribute to
their social roles in terms of parenthood and filial duty, resulting in a strong
sense of guilt. These social roles are expressed in imperious terms, as Mrs.
Zeng describes: “In China, it is not like it is in France; parents sacrifice them-
selves for their children.”
The wish to “fulfil one’s responsibilities” is therefore often a decisive factor
in the decision to migrate, for both men and women. As Mrs. Yu explains:
I could not solve the most fundamental problems, so what’s the point
of talking about the rest? [If I had remained in China] my child would
only have been able to study up to A-level standard, and would then
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only have been able to find a very precarious position on the job
market. That’s all. My child would have had no future. […] Now, fi-
nancially, I can afford to send my daughter to university. That was
the biggest problem facing me and I overcame it. It’s my greatest
success!
Another worry relates to the purchase of housing in China. Soaring prop-
erty prices, which had long been subsidised by the work units, are paradig-
matic of these transformations. Boosted by the state, a private housing
market has developed, quickly becoming very costly and speculative. This
situation is a subject of concern to the people interviewed, who face the
need to buy an apartment, either out of necessity following demolition of
their old quarters in urban redevelopment, or in order to meet the expec-
tations of their middle-class social group, which looks down on old buildings.
Moreover, many associate this desire for new housing with concern for the
future of their child, and actually think they have a duty to comply with
new practices, in particular by buying their son a new apartment to improve
his marriage prospects. Even though her son had not yet found a fiancée, it
was this worry that led to the departure of Mrs. Chu: “I had to be able to
buy an apartment for my son in order for him to be able to get married.”
Finally, changes in lifestyles and the rapid development of a consumer so-
ciety (43) have led to the emergence of new needs in terms of consumer and
leisure goods. Economic capacity has been a determining factor when it
comes to evaluating the success of an individual or family, to the detriment
of the statutory elements given priority in the old system. The social pres-
sure is very great, because for some of the women I spoke to, opportunities
to consume became a test of their position in the social hierarchy. For ex-
ample, when her income dropped, Mrs. Chu struggled to maintain her rank.
“Not everyone can live at the same level. Some of us have to go out, go to
the restaurant, get together with old classmates. Everyone pays in turn, and
you can’t get away with never paying.” These new desires, which are seen
as legitimate, become especially delicate to manage when they come from
an only child, because once more they bring into play the ability of parents
to fulfil their role and guarantee the happiness of their offspring.
These new enticements foster feelings of frustration when it comes to actual
living standards. The stories of the male and female migrants therefore reveal
a sense of relative deprivation (44), with certain categories of the urban popu-
lation perceiving that their own quality of life is not improving as quickly as
that of other groups with which they compare themselves. They interpret this
discrepancy as a sign of impoverishment, as underlined by Mrs. Ding: “In China,
although the economy has grown a lot, living standards have not improved
much from the point of view of families.” It is true that since the Maoist era,
which had a reputation for operating on a relatively egalitarian basis, inequal-
ities have increased greatly (45), to the point that at the start of the 2000s, 20
percent of the population possessed nearly half of the country’s total re-
sources. (46) The dissatisfaction generated by this situation, which has been de-
scribed as a social divide, (47) emerged in the meetings held in Paris, where
interviewees denounce a society perceived as unfair in its redistribution of
wealth. In fact, the entire social stratification of cities was reconfigured in the
1980s. (48) Workers and employees of state-owned enterprises, who previously
enjoyed very privileged position, suffered a drop in status compared with new
social groups, in particular private entrepreneurs, who displayed their success
through rapid enrichment and ostentatious spending.
Despite a general improvement in living conditions, confusion shows
through in accounts of the professional opportunities available in China and
the meagre salaries on offer. The imbalance between the speed at which
needs developed compared to salaries, especially in the public sector, ap-
pears to have been particularly demotivating, as emphasised by Mrs. Ding,
who states, “Even if I had found a good job in China, I really would not have
wanted to do it, because the wages were really too low.” The salaries on
offer abroad look much more attractive in comparison.
An increasingly insecure family situation and
newly divorced status: A first step towards a
move abroad
These professional and economic difficulties also interact with relationships
within the family unit, which is the third subject of major concern mentioned
by the migrants. Tensions within couples, in particular, are behind a significant
rise in divorce rates for city dwellers in their forties. The number of divorces
has tripled in the 20 years since the implementation of reform and opening. (49)
Although new marriage laws introduced in 1981 and 2001 have contributed
to this trend by facilitating the procedures, (50) these legal changes are not the
only cause. Of the female migrants interviewed in Paris, the proportion of di-
vorcees was well above the national average, at a rate of 80 percent (40 out
of 50 interviewees), while the men remained married (apart from two out of
14). These rates, coupled with the short time, in many cases, between the di-
vorce judgement and the decision to leave for abroad, give rise to questions
about the links between marital status and migration. The migrants them-
selves portrayed these two situations in terms of a cause/effect relationship.
According to Mrs. Yu:
Out of every ten women who have left for abroad, eight have done
so because they were not happy in their home life. […] In very few
cases have people left purely out of curiosity when the relationship
with the husband was good and everything was fine with the family.
However, as Mrs. Yu explains:
You only get divorced when there are big problems and it is impos-
sible to go on. For example, if the man has a mistress or the wife a
lover, it is impossible not to divorce; if there is a conflict between
mother-in-law and daughter-in-law, it’s less frequent, because ulti-
mately that is not such a big problem. In China, it’s enough for [the
husband] to be able to earn money and support the family. Every-
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thing else is just small issues beneath mention; they don’t matter. All
I need to be satisfied is to earn money, support my family, and spend
my days [living a simple life].
Despite this principled opposition, it was more often than not the women
we interviewed who initiated the divorce. They spoke at length about this
choice, (51) which amounted for some of them to “no longer having a fam-
ily.”
For these female migrants, the increase in the number of divorces is one
of the consequences of the reforms, which have led to a change in attitudes
and an individualisation of behaviour that they see as reflecting a drop in
morality. It appears that the balance long maintained in couples of this gen-
eration was upset by newly expressed expectations of the partner regarding
personal fulfilment and happiness, which then led to disappointment and
tensions. (52) Based on observations made in a village in north-east China,
the anthropologist Yan Yunxiang observed similar developments and the
emergence of a new family ideal: “The modernity of the contemporary fam-
ily lies in the rising importance of individual desires, emotions and agencies
in family life, on the one hand, and the centrality of the individual in family
relations, on the other hand.” (53) An analysis of the reasons that pushed fe-
male migrants to ask for a divorce shows that the gender roles within cou-
ples were put under pressure in the decades leading up to their departure.
It seems that transformations in the relationship with money, which is tak-
ing an increasingly important place in interpersonal relations, have accen-
tuated disagreements between partners. First and foremost, the interviewed
women often complained about the behaviour of their husbands, who no
longer matched up to what the women believed they had the right to ex-
pect of them. They are accused of “failing to assume their responsibilities”
as head of the family, “not taking charge of the family,” and “not bringing
money into the home.” After decades of talk about gender equality, and
even though all my female contacts had taken part in economic activity in
China before their divorce, these disappointed expectations show that men
were seen as the main and essential economic providers for the family. In-
deed, the majority of the interviewed women assess their contribution to
family life almost exclusively in terms of their financial capacity. Mrs. Hou
was in despair about her husband, a passionate gambler: “He has no love
for his wife, parents, brothers, or sisters. The only person he cares about is
himself. After all these years spent together, he never brought any money
home. [...] He doesn’t look after his sons. He is selfish.”
In these circumstances, being an unemployed man brings even more dis-
honour, especially if your wife continues to work. Some men refuse to take
unskilled jobs, like the husband of Mrs. Li, who was a construction engineer
but now prefers to “stay home.” Mrs. Zhang, who worked in the clothing in-
dustry, explains the situation as follows:
The situation is now reversed. [...] Today, it is the man who stays
home, makes the meals and serves his wife; women are the ones who
go out and earn the money. […] In the home, the woman has the
final word because the man does not earn much.
The link between financial capacity and power relations within the house-
hold is clearly apparent in the accounts of the female migrants. The inter-
viewed women show obvious contempt for husbands who fail to assume
their economic role. Mrs. Li compares her husband to a cleaning lady. Mr.
Guo, for example, whose conjugal relations soured after he lost his job, ex-
plains that his wife “thought she was stronger than me. She despised me
[and criticised me] for being a man who could not support his wife.” What
is therefore taking place in these cases is a veritable symbolic reversal in
the hierarchy, because it is now the woman who occupies the dominant
position. The husbands are described by their wives as “not being man
enough” or being “incompetent.” Quite apart from their financial capacity,
their overall masculinity is also called into question and undermined by the
economic transformations. Moreover, the interviews we conducted with
male migrants show that they share these dominant representations of gen-
der roles. They often emphasise the fact that they have left “in order to sup-
port their family” and explain that they send most of their salary “home.”
They therefore chose to migrate in order to conform to this social role,
which has taken on an economic aspect. It can therefore be seen that in
some families, when the husband becomes unemployed, the economic and
family support roles that would traditionally fall to him are carried out by
his wife. Women find themselves at the head of the family, either because
they have succeeded in keeping their jobs or because they have accepted
new, lower status jobs. These permutations in social roles often weaken re-
lations within couples.
Secondly, in households that are not necessarily experiencing economic
difficulties, another major reason given by female migrants for their divorce
is the discovery that the husband is having extra-marital relations. “Things
have changed. China is truly chaotic. In the past, only the rich had mis-
tresses, but now even the poor have them,” explained Mrs. Ding. Adultery
appears to be closely linked to social and economic success. Therefore, fi-
nancial affluence and flaunted sexuality would appear to go hand-in-hand
in the construction of a dominant model of middle- and upper-class mas-
culinity. Two related phenomena are touched upon. On the one hand, men
considered to be rich are courted by young women, and on the other hand,
it now appears to be positively regarded, especially in business circles, for
men to display their social and economic success through ostentatious
spending and by appearing in public in the company of young women. (54)
This is how Mrs. Xu explained the attitude of her husband: “In China, it is
really common for managers to have a person [a mistress]. It’s fair to say
that in China, if the [economic] conditions [of the man] are not good, no
one will go with him.”
At the same time, implicitly, husbands are expressing new expectations
of feminine behaviour. For example, Mrs. Tai, a hyperactive businesswoman,
explained that her husband backed up his request for a divorce by com-
plaining about her “excessively masculine” behaviour and the fact that she
“only thought of work.” Indeed, the generation of city-dwelling women suc-
ceeding that of the Red Guards does not match the representations of fem-
ininity that characterise society under reform. (55) Yet some men in this
generation are now turning to younger women who openly present an
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image of women as being passive, flirtatious, and physically ultra-feminine,
making strategic use of their submission to men. (56) Finally, the interviewed
women explain that some aspects of married life that had long been toler-
ated are now causes for divorce. These include disagreements between hus-
band and wife, conjugal violence, and even “intrusion by the mother-in-law”
into the couple’s intimate space. The accounts of migrant women therefore
show that the representations of gender roles and power relations within
couples are being renegotiated at the time that these men or women are
deciding to leave their country.
The stories of the female migrants emphasise how their status as divorcees,
and in particular as female divorcees taking sole charge of the family, has
put them in an unprecedented situation that greatly undermines them. (57)
However, this theme was almost never brought up unprompted by the male
migrants, most of whom were still part of a couple. First and foremost, it ap-
pears to be society’s view (58) that is particularly difficult to manage. Divorced
status is calling into question the distribution of traditional social roles be-
tween men and women in a society where celibacy was once virtually un-
known; according to the female migrants, it is still an exception in the
over-40s generation. Having divorced very early in 1986, Mrs. Hong re-
counted how her new status made her famous in her factory, and how work-
ers would suddenly appear in her office just to stare at her. Women are often
shouldered with responsibility for the break-up, because they are expected
to be able to endure everything in order to maintain the family unit, as high-
lighted by the proverb: “Marry a chicken, follow the chicken, marry a dog,
follow the dog” (Jiaji sui ji, jiagou sui gou).
For some of the older women interviewed, divorce is the equivalent of a
loss of face. “In China, if you are not married but you have a child, people
will die of laughter, they will not respect you. You are not someone to be
taken seriously… It is really bad,” explains Mrs. Yu. Dishonour appears to be
directed not only towards the couple in question but also stains the repu-
tations of their parents and children. Furthermore, they claim the conse-
quences affect all levels of socialisation, to the point where even jobs are
threatened. As Mrs. Li explains, “In my profession, getting divorced was not
allowed. [...] My circle of life was very narrow. If all those people criticised
me, I’d drown myself. In the eyes of other people, I would never again be
able to hold my head high.” She thought that if her divorce were made pub-
lic, she would lose the authority needed to continue working as a trade
union official. Indeed, in order to avoid the very strong social stigma, some
couples decide to hide the fact that they have split up. This is the case, for
example, with Mrs. Shao. In order to maintain an illusion of family unity,
she continued to live with her husband for three years before finally leaving
quietly for abroad. Her son was only told of the split a few years later. The
accounts reveal that this disgrace is also internalised by some female mi-
grants, who cannot forgive themselves for what they consider a failure. In
addition to feelings of failure in their role as wives, these women also ex-
press guilt towards their child, for whom divorce is often seen as a major
destabilising factor. (59) In China, as elsewhere, divorce is often accompanied
by a drop in economic status (60). Single-parent families cannot fall back on
the strategies of working class couples who reach a relatively comfortable
standard of living by combining two incomes, one of which covers day-to-
day living expenses while the other is saved for major expenditures and to
cover unforeseen circumstances. In this configuration, single-parent families
can potentially find themselves more vulnerable to poverty. (61) Unequal in-
comes between the sexes aggravate this phenomenon because women typ-
ically receive lower salaries than men. Also, according to the female
migrants, alimony is often not paid or is only partially paid, and the parent
who has not won custody breaks his or her links with the child.
The life histories collected also show that losing the family home was an-
other consequence some women have to adjust to after divorcing. Owing to
a lack of means, some couples had to continue living together in a marital
apartment divided into two territories following their divorce. It should also
be noted that some female migrants preferred the option of giving up all their
rights and property in order to obtain a swift divorce judgement rather than
having to enter into difficult negotiations with their husband. “The only way
to get the divorce was to give it all to him. If I give you everything, it’s over,”
says Mrs. Yu. These economic transactions actually equate to “buying” the
agreement of the recalcitrant partner. Opting for this strategy was undoubt-
edly easier for people intending to leave for abroad. For this reason, a number
of the interviewed women said they no longer possessed anything in China,
including a home.
On the other hand, most of them had fought to win custody of their child.
By this decision they were able to contradict the commonly-held prejudice
that divorced women are bad mothers who place no importance in the fam-
ily, and instead underlined their attachment to their parental role, giving ab-
solute priority to the child. However, it amounts to a dubious victory because
it takes them even further from the standard family pattern. “Deliberately”
becoming the head of a single-parent family, unlike becoming a widow, was
not something to be undertaken lightly in their social group at the end of
the 1990s, and for some it amounted to an infringement of social roles. Also,
in most cases in our interviews, these single-parent households consisting
of a mother and child are integrated into the maternal branch of the family,
and the extended family framework takes over from the nuclear family. The
parental roles are thus shared with grandparents, uncles, and aunts.
Having become the sole head of their families, these women often have
to assume all the costs of raising their child. For them, it is simply not an
option for divorce, already a social negative, to be accompanied by a drop
in economic status for the child. The need to financially secure the child’s
material well-bring and future is another reason often given by female mi-
grants to explain why they left for abroad. Explaining migration as a sacrifice
made for the family serves to curtail criticism and frames mobility in the
context of positive and highly consensual norms. Therefore, this aim of en-
suring a financially comfortable life prevails, from their point of view, over
their daily presence in their child’s life. This approach gives rise to a definition
of the maternal role that favours the function of the economic provider
over that of the provider of care. (62) The child is, in most cases, temporarily
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looked after by a grandmother or in some cases by an aunt. He or she then
leaves for college, moving onto the campus. For the men in my sampling,
concerns relating to their parenthood are expressed in far less critical terms,
and are above all described from the perspective of sending money home
to their wives, who have remained in China to manage the daily life, edu-
cation, and future plans of their offspring.
The status of being a single divorced woman taking sole charge of her
family is therefore an additional handicap that accentuates professional and
economic difficulties that existed before the divorce. Yet my interviewees
feel they have little chance of escaping this unappreciated category and re-
marrying, because the fact that they have a child to look after is combined
with unfavourable age-related prejudices. “Who is interested in you when
you’re 40?” asked Mrs. Yang. This social perspective clearly does not apply
in the same way to men, because a certain number of their ex-husbands
have remarried.
Conclusion
The people who turn to migration are faced with a series of life course acci-
dents (redundancy, drop in income, unemployed husband or wife, marital con-
flicts) that threaten their professional future, their standard of living, or their
position in the social hierarchy. For women, divorce tends to have a multiplying
effect on previous obstacles. Therefore, some of these future female migrants
find themselves, according to the typology of Robert Castel, (63) in a zone of
“social vulnerability” that could potentially lead to a process of disaffiliation,
i.e., a break in the societal link resulting in marginalisation and social exclusion.
Indeed, the two major areas of social integration are put to the test: on the
one hand, work, which generates not only a stable income but also a certain
social utility, thus providing a place in society; on the other hand, primary and
secondary socialisation networks, which allow relational integration and access
to forms of social support. However, the economic and social transformations
have had different effects on city-dwelling middle-class men and women in
their forties. Gender representations have put direct economic pressure on the
former, because money has become the main indicator of social success. In
such conditions, for men who have been made redundant and have been un-
able to find a stable new job, it has become more and more difficult not to as-
sume the role of main economic provider of the family on the one hand, and
not to not publicly display one’s financial affluence on the other.
The constraints imposed by gender norms break down differently for
women, especially if they are divorced. They have had to face up to profes-
sional and economic tensions and social stigmatisation. This is partly a result
of their new status as divorced women having to assume sole charge of a
single-parent family. This position, which is generally not looked upon kindly
and forces them to apply themselves to masculine areas, represents a chal-
lenge; it is a triggering factor in their decision to leave their country. Male
and female migrants do share similar perceptions, however. They feel they
did not have enough resources in place to assume their social obligations
and saw migrating as a new and alternative way of conforming to the ex-
pectations weighing on them. It can therefore be seen that the changing
social norms and gender roles that have influenced middle-class city
dwellers in their forties in northern China have had an impact beyond the
borders of the country and have greatly contributed to the gender config-
uration of this migratory flow heading for Europe. These developments in
gender norms and relations also explain why the migratory projects of men
and women differ. The main aim of the former, who are still married, is to
send money back to their families in China; the latter, most of whom are
divorced, wish to provide a better standard of living for their children, to es-
cape the stigmatised status of the “divorced woman,” and (why not?) to
build a new life for themselves once in France.
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